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Abstract
We consider a discrete-time dynamic search game in which a number of players compete
to find an invisible object that is moving according to a time-varying Markov chain. We
examine the subgame perfect equilibria of these games. The main result of the paper is that
the set of subgame perfect equilibria is exactly the set of greedy strategy profiles, i.e. those
strategy profiles in which the players always choose an action that maximizes their probability
of immediately finding the object. We discuss various variations and extensions of the model.
Keywords: Game Theory; Search game; Optimal search; Greedy strategy; Subgame perfect
equilibrium.
1 Introduction
In this paper we consider a dynamic search game, in which an object moves according to a time-
varying Markov chain across a finite set of states. The set of competing players can be either finite
or infinite. At each period, an active player is chosen according to a fixed distribution. The active
player can search for the object in one of the possible positions. If the object is found by the
active player, this player wins and the game ends. Otherwise, the object moves according to the
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transition matrix, and the game enters the next period. Each player observes the action chosen by
his opponents, and the transition probabilities, initial probabilities and probabilities of being the
active player are known to all players. The goal of each player is to find the object and win the
game. So each player prefers the winning outcome and is indifferent between the outcomes in which
one of his opponents wins or in which nobody finds the object.
The main result of this paper is that the set of subgame perfect equilibria is exactly the set of
greedy strategy profiles, also known as myopic strategy profiles, i.e. those strategy profiles in which
the active player always selects one of the most likely positions containing the object. The key to
this result is to show that by playing a greedy strategy, each player can guarantee that he wins with
a probability at least as much as the probability of being active at each period.
The rest of this paper is divided as follows. In Section 1.1 we refer to related literature. In Section 1.2
we introduce the model and in Section 1.3 we present an illustrative example In Section 2 we study
the winning probabilities of players playing a greedy strategy, and we present a characterization of
the subgame perfect equilibria. We show that the set of subgame perfect equilibria is exactly the
set of greedy strategy profiles. In Section 3 we discuss some extensions of the model and see to
which extend the main result still holds or not. The conclusion is in Section 4.
1.1 Related literature
The field of search problems is one of the original disciplines of Operations Research, with various
applications such as military problems, R&D problems or patent races, and many of these models
involve multiple decision makers. In the basic settings, the searcher’s goal is to find a hidden object,
also called the target, with maximal probability or as soon as possible. By now, the field of search
problems has evolved into a wide range of models. The models in the literature differ from each
other by the characteristics of the searchers and of the objects. Concerning objects, there might
be one or several objects, mobile or not, and they might have no aim or their aim is to not be
found. Concerning the searchers, there might be one or more. When there is only one searcher, the
searcher faces an optimization problem. When there are more than one searchers, they might be
cooperative or not. If the searchers cooperate, their aim is similar to the settings with one player:
they might want to minimize the expected time of search, the worst time, or some search cost
function. If the searchers do not cooperate, the problem becomes a search game with at least two
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strategic non-cooperative players, and hence game theoretic solution concepts and arguments will
play an important role. For an introduction to search games, we refer to [2], [11], [12], [13], [14],
and for surveys see [5] and [20].
The interface between Operations Research and Game Theory is attracting much attention nowa-
days. Examples are (PPAD) computational complexity of Nash equilibria (see [25], [26], [22], [7],
[29] and [8]), price of anarchy (see [28], [6]), congestion games (see [17], [16], [18] and [19]) and
manufacturer-retailer problems (see [9] and [3]).
There are many different types of search games in the literature due to variations in characteristics of
the searchers and of the object. [27] introduced a simple search game with one searcher, in which an
object is moving across two locations referred to as “state 1” and “state 2” respectively, according to
a discrete-time Markov chain. The objective of the searcher can be either to minimize the expected
number of looks to find the object, or to maximize the probability of finding the object within a
given horizon. The model allows for overlooking probabilities, which means that even if the searcher
chooses the correct location, he may fail to find the object there. Instead, [23] investigates the search
problem with three states, while assuming perfect detection, so not accounting for overlooking
probabilities. [10] investigates a search game similar to [27], but in addition to searching for the
object in state 1 or state 2, the player has a third option which is to wait. This option is costless
whereas searching is costly. Waiting could induce a favourable probability distribution over the two
states next period. They find a unique optimal strategy characterized by two thresholds. [21] in
his PhD thesis studies the structural properties of the optimal strategy, where the goal is to find
the object while minimizing the search costs. Thereby he derived some properties of the optimal
strategy for the search problem with a finite set of states in the no-overlook case and for the case
where each state has the same overlooking probability and cost. [4] investigates a search problem
with two states in which the object moves according to a continuous-time Markov process. His
objective is to find the object with a minimal expected cost, where the “real time” until the object
is found is also taken into account in the cost structure. A competitive environment with more
searchers and a static object is considered in [24]. A classical reference for an overview of search
games is the book of [1]. For a recent paper on search games, we refer to [15]. They model the
search game as a zero-sum two-person stochastic game where the first player is looking for the other
one. They provide upper and lower bounds on the value of the game.
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1.2 The Model
The Game. An object is moving over a finite set S = {1, ..., n} according to a time-varying
Markov chain. The initial distribution of the object is given by pi = (pis)s∈S, and the transition
probabilities at each period t ∈ N are given by the S×S transition matrix Pt, where entry Pt(s, s
′)
is the probability that the object moves to state s′, given it is in state s at period t.
Let I denote a set of players, who compete to find the object. We assume that I ⊆ N; so the set
I can be either finite or countably infinite. The players do not observe the current state of the
object, but they know the initial distribution pi and the transition matrices Pt, for each t ∈ N. At
each period t ∈ N one of the players is active: player i is active with probability qi > 0, where∑
i∈I qi = 1. The active player chooses a state st ∈ S. If the object is in state st, then the active
player finds the object and wins the game. Otherwise the game enters period t + 1. We assume
that each player observes the actions chosen by his opponents, and knows the probabilities qi, for
each i ∈ I.
The goal of each player is to find the object and win the game. For each player the game has
three possible outcomes. The first possible outcome is that the player himself finds the object and
wins the game. The second outcome is that one of his opponents finds the object and wins the
game. The third outcome is that no one finds the object. In this game each player prefers the first
outcome, but is indifferent between the second and third outcomes. This means that players do not
have opposite interests, which makes it a non-zero-sum game.
Actions & Histories. The action set for each player i is Ai = S. Thus, a history at period
t ∈ N is a sequence ht = (s1, . . . , st−1) ∈ S
t−1 of past actions. By Ht = S
t−1 we denote the set of
all histories at period t. Note that H1 consists of the empty sequence. Given a history ht, with
the knowledge of the initial probability distribution pi and the transition matrices P1, . . . , Pt−1, the
players can calculate the probability distribution of the location of the object at period t.
Strategies. A strategy for player i is a sequence of functions σi = (σi,t)t∈N where σi,t : Ht → ∆(S)
for each period t ∈ N. The interpretation is that, at each period t ∈ N, if player i becomes the
active player, then given the history ht, the strategy σi,t recommends to search state s ∈ S with
probability σi,t(ht)(s). We denote by Σi the set of strategies of player i. We say that a strategy is
pure if, for any history, it places probability 1 on one action.
A strategy is called greedy if, for any history, it places probability 1 on the most likely states. In
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the literature the greedy strategy is sometimes also called the myopic strategy.
Winning probabilities. Consider a strategy profile σ = (σi)i∈I . The probability under σ that
player i wins is denoted by ui(σ). Note that
∑
i∈I
ui(σ) = 1− Probσ[object never found].
The aim of player i is to maximize ui(σ). If the object has not been found before period t, and the
history is ht, the continuation winning probability from period t onward is denoted by ui(σ)(ht) for
player i.
Subgame perfect equilibrium. A strategy σi for player i is a best response to a profile of
strategies σ−i for all other players if ui(σ) ≥ ui(σ
′
i, σ−i) for every strategy σ
′
i ∈ Σi. A strategy
profile σ = (σi)i∈I is called an equilibrium of the game if σi is a best response to σ−i for each player
i ∈ I.
A strategy σi for player i is a best response in the subgame at history h to a profile of strategies
σ−i for all other players, if ui(σ)(h) ≥ ui(σ
′
i, σ−i)(h) for every strategy σ
′
i ∈ Σi. A strategy profile
σ = (σi)i∈I is called a subgame perfect equilibrium if, at each history h, in the subgame at history
h the strategy σi is a best response to σ−i for each player i ∈ I. In other words, σ is a subgame
perfect equilibrium if it induces an equilibrium in each subgame.
1.3 An illustrative example
In the model we introduced the greedy strategies. However, it is not clear a priori if those strategies
are relevant, nor if one greedy strategy can be better or worst than another one. Now we examine an
example in order to try to answer those questions. Consider the following game with a parameter
c ∈ (0, 1), with two states and two players. At each period player 1 is active with probability
q1 = 0.99 = 1 − q2. The initial probability of the location of the object is pi = (c, 1 − c) and the
transition matrices are defined as follows: for all t ∈ N,
Pt = P =
(
c 1− c
1 0
)
.
The induced Markov chain of this game is depicted in Figure 1.
We discuss two cases.
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1 2
1− c
c 0
1
Figure 1: An illustrative example
Case 1. Consider the case in which 0 < c < 1
3
. At period t = 1 it is more likely for the object to
be in state 2 as c < 1− c.
Intuitively, if player 2 gets the chance to be active at period 1, he should look in state 2 as his
chance to play later is quite low. However, it is not immediately clear what player 1 should do at
period 1. On the one hand, if he looks in state 1 and he does not find the object, then he finds it
in period 2 with probability 1 if he can play, which is likely to happen as q1 = 0.99. On the other
hand he might also simply want to maximise his chance to find the object at period 1 by looking
at box 2.
More precisely, assume first that player 2 is active at period 1. If he looks at state 1, with probability
c he finds the object and with probability 1− c the active player at period 2 can find the object by
looking at state 1. In this case, player 2 finds the object with probability c+ q2 · (1− c). However,
if he looks at state 2, with probability 1 − c he finds the object and with probability c the active
player at period 2 can find the object with probability 1 − c by looking at state 2. In this case,
player 2 finds the object with probability at least 1− c+ q2 · c · (1− c) > c+ q2 · (1− c) as q2 = 0.01
and c < 1
3
. Thus, it is strictly better for player 2 to look at state 2 at period 1. The same holds for
each subgame in which the probability distribution of the object is (c, 1− c).
Now assume that player 1 is active at period 1. If he looks at state 1, then similarly to the analysis
of player 2, he finds the object with probability c+q1 · (1−c). However, if player 1 decides to choose
state 2 at each period he is active, by our analysis of player 2, it follows that player 2 will also do the
same. Hence player 1 finds the object with probability (1− c)+ q1 · c · (1− c)+ q1 · c
2 · (1− c)+ . . . =
1− c+ q1 · c > c+ q1 · (1− c) as q1 < 1. So it is better for player 1 to choose state 2 at period 1.
From our discussion, it follows that every Nash equilibrium induces the play in which at each period
the active player chooses state 2. If a deviation occurs to state 1 and the object is not found, the
next active player chooses state 1 and wins the game. This is a greedy strategy profile as at each
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period the most likely state is chosen.
Case 2. Consider the case in which c = 1/2.
In this case, both states are equally likely, so a greedy strategy can choose any state at period 1.
Note that at any period, if state 1 is chosen and the object is not found, a greedy strategy finds
the object at the next period in state 1. However, if state 2 is chosen and the object is not found,
a greedy strategy can choose any of the two states at the next period. Therefore, there are many
greedy strategy profiles, and all can induce different plays. It is then natural to ask whether every
greedy strategy profiles induce the same winning probabilities. As we will show later, every greedy
strategy profile leads to the winning probability q1 for player 1 and q2 for player 2.
2 Greedy strategies and Subgame perfect equilibria
In this section we prove our main result, which is that the set of subgame perfect equilibria is
exactly the set of greedy strategy profiles. We start by introducing an intermediate result related
to the winning probability guarantees of the players who play a greedy strategy.
Proposition 1. Consider a strategy profile σ = (σj)j∈I and a player i ∈ I. If σi is a greedy strategy,
then under σ, the object is found with probability 1 and player i wins with probability at least qi.
Consequently, if σ is a greedy strategy profile, then under σ, each player i wins with probability qi.
Proof. Let σ = (σj)j∈I be a strategy profile in which player i plays a greedy strategy.
Step 1. Under σ, the object is found with probability 1.
Proof of Step 1. Consider an arbitrary period t ∈ N and suppose that the object has not been
found yet. Then, player i plays with probability qi, and when he plays he wins with probability at
least 1/n. This implies that the object is found at period t with probability at least qi/n. Since
this holds for each period t, under σ the object is found with probability 1.
Step 2. Under σ, player i wins with probability at least qi.
Proof of Step 2. Consider a period t ∈ N and a history h ∈ Ht. For each state s ∈ S, let
zh(s) denote the probability that the object is in state s at period t given the history h. Let
z∗h = maxs∈S zh(s).
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For each player j ∈ I, let wj(h) denote the probability that after history h player j becomes the
active player and by using the mixed action σj(h) he wins immediately. Since σi is a greedy strategy,
we have wi(h) = qi · z
∗
h. For each other player j 6= i we have wj(h) ≤ qj · z
∗
h. Hence, given that the
object is found at period t after the history h, the conditional probability that player i finds it is
wi(h)∑
j∈I wj(h)
≥
qi · z
∗
h∑
j∈I qj · z
∗
h
= qi.
Since this holds for every period t and every history h ∈ Ht, and since by Step 1 the object is found
under σ with probability 1, player i wins with probability at least qi.
Theorem 2. The set of subgame perfect equilibria is exactly the set of greedy strategy profiles.
Proof. The proof is divided in two steps.
Step 1. Every greedy strategy profile is a subgame perfect equilibrium.
Proof of Step 1. Let σ be a greedy strategy profile and consider a subgame at a history h ∈ H .
We show that σ is an equilibrium in this subgame. Consider a player i and a deviation σ′i. By
Proposition 1, the strategy σj guarantees to each player j ∈ I that he wins with probability at least
qj , even if another player deviates. Since
∑
j∈I qj = 1, we find ui(σ)(h) = qi and ui(σ
′
i, σ−i) ≤ qi.
Thus, the deviation σ′i is not profitable.
Step 2. Every subgame perfect equilibrium is a greedy strategy profile.
Proof of Step 2. Assume by way of contradiction that there exists a subgame perfect equilibrium
σ = (σi)i∈I , which is not a greedy strategy profile. Suppose that σi is not greedy at history h. Let
strategy σ′i be a one-deviation from σi at history h, under which player i plays greedy at history h.
So σ′i(h) 6= σi(h) and σ
′
i(h
′) = σi(h
′) for every h′ ∈ H \ {h}.
Let zh(σi(h)) denote the probability that player i finds the object immediately with σi at history
h given that he is the active player. Similarly, let zh(σ−i(h)) denote the probability that one of
the opponents of player i finds the object immediately with σ−i at history h given that one of the
opponents is active.
Then we have
ui(σi, σ−i)(h) = qi · [zh(σi(h)) + (1− zh(σi(h))) · qi)] + (1− qi) · (1− zh(σ−i(h))) · qi
= qi · zh(σi(h)) · (1− qi) + qi · [qi + (1− qi) · (1− zh(σ−i(h)))].
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The first equality follows from the following argument. Player i has a probability of qi of becoming
the active player. Then, he wins immediately with probability zh(σi(h)) or he does not find the
object immediately with probability 1 − zh(σi(h)) and still wins in the future with probability qi
by Proposition 1. However, with probability 1 − qi one of his opponents is active. Then, player
i still has a chance to win. His opponents fail to find the object immediately with probability
1− zh(σ−i(h)) and then player i can again win in the future with probability qi.
Similarly, for the deviation σ′i we have
ui(σ
′
i, σ−i)(h) = qi · [zh(σ
′
i(h)) + (1− zh(σ
′
i(h))) · qi] + (1− qi) · (1− zh(σ−i(h)) · qi
= qi · zh(σ
′
i(h)) · (1− qi) + qi · [qi + (1− qi) · (1− zh(σ−i(h))].
Since zh(σ
′
i(h)) > zh(σi(h)) holds due to the fact that σ
′
i is greedy at h but σi is not, we find
ui(σ
′
i, σ−i)(h) > ui(σ)(h). This however contradicts the assumption that σ is a subgame perfect
equilibrium.
3 Extensions & Variations
In this section we consider several extensions of the model and discuss if the main theorem still
holds or not.
3.1 Extensions where our results still hold
• History dependent transitions. In the model description we assumed that the object moves
according to a time-varying Markov chain. A more general situation is when the transition proba-
bilities at each period t can also depend on (i) the sequence of past choices of the players, (ii) the
sequence of past active players, and (iii) the sequence of states visited by the object in the past.
Without any modification in the proofs, our main result, Theorem 2, remains valid.
• Overlooking. Our main result, Theorem 2, can be extended to a model with overlooking proba-
bilities. Overlooking means that the object is in the chosen state, but the active player “overlooks”
it and therefore does not find it. Note that players cannot distinguish between overlooking and
searching in a vacant state. For this extension, let δs < 1 denote the probability of overlooking the
object in state s, for each s ∈ S.
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The overlooking probabilities need to be taken into account when defining greedy strategies. A
greedy strategy should choose a state s that maximizes the probability of containing the object times
the probability of not overlooking the object, i.e. it should maximize the immediate probability of
finding the object.
• No active player. The model could also be adjusted for the probability that no player is active,
i.e.
∑
i∈I qi < 1. Then, r := 1 −
∑
i∈I qi is the probability that no player is active at a certain
period. We still assume that qi > 0 for each player i, so that r < 1. Our main result, Theorem 2,
would still hold, as the key properties of Proposition 1 remain valid.
3.2 Variations where results break down or need adjustment
• Robustness to finite horizon and discounting. Let σ be a greedy strategy profile. By
Theorem 2, σ is a subgame perfect equilibrium, and in particular, an equilibrium. By standard
arguments, for every error-term ε > 0, the strategy profile σ is an ε-equilibrium if the horizon of
the game is finite but sufficiently long. Also, σ is a subgame perfect ε-equilibrium if, instead of
maximizing the probability to find the object, now each player i maximizes
∑
∞
t=1 δ
t−1 · zi,t, where
δ ∈ (0, 1) is a discount factor and zi,t is the probability that player i finds the object at period t.
The main reason why this robustness property holds is that, as long as at least one player plays a
greedy strategy, the object will be found at an exponential rate, so essentially in finite time.
Note however that a greedy strategy is not necessarily a 0-equilibrium on finite horizon. Indeed,
consider the game represented in Figure 2 over T = 2 periods. There are three states. The initial
probability distribution of the object is given by pi = (1/3 + ε, 1/3 + 2ε, 1/3 − 3ε), where ε > 0 is
small enough so that 0.99 · (2/3+3ε) ≤ 2/3, and the transitions at period 1 are given by the arrows
in Figure 2. There are two players, and player 1 plays at each period with probability q1 = 0.99.
1 2 3
1 1
1
Figure 2: A 2-period game
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The greedy strategy profile is to choose state 2 at period 1 and state 1 at period 2. Under this
strategy profile, player 1 finds the object with probability q1 · (2/3 + 3ε) ≤ 2/3. However, it would
be a profitable deviation for player 1 to choose state 3 at period 1 and state 1 at period 2. Indeed,
player 1 is the active player at both periods with probability (q1)
2, and in that case this strategy
finds the object with probability 1.
• Period-dependent probabilities qi. It is crucial for our proofs that the probabilities with
which the players become active do not depend on the period. The reason is that in this setting,
players have to balance between finding the object at the present period and putting the opponent
into a difficult position in the next period.
• Infinitely many states. Assume S = N. It is easy to see that it can be impossible to find
the object with probability 1 if the transition law of the object is diffuse. Suppose that the object
starts in states 1, 2 and 3 with equal probability, and then moves to 3t+1 new states with equal
probability at each period t. In that case, the highest probability to find the object is at most
1/3 + 1/9 + 1/27 + · · · = 1/2.
As a consequence, a greedy strategy profile might not be a Nash equilibrium, and vice-versa. Indeed,
it might be very important to choose a certain state at period 1, even if it has a low probability of
containing the object, so that such a diffusion of the object is prevented.
4 Conclusion
In this paper we examined a discrete time and space search game with multiple competitive searchers
who look for one object moving over finitely many locations. We showed that if each player has
the same probability to play at each period, the set of subgame perfect equilibria is exactly the
set of greedy strategy profiles (cf. Theorem 2). We discussed several variations, such as the finite
truncation of the game, the discounted version of the game, cases with infinitely many states,
overlooking probabilities and we examined the possibility that no player is active at a period. A
challenging task would be to investigate stochastic search games when the probability of a player
to be active depends on the history.
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